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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20010790-CA
v.

Priority No. 15

MARIE S. MCKINNON,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The State appeals from an order dismissing a charge of false notarial certification,
a class B misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7718a-l(2)(a) (1999), and 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the statute extending the limitations period for criminal offenses
involving fraud or breach of fiduciary obligation applies when the State discovers the
offense before the original limitations period expires?
Standard of review: Because "the proper interpretation of a statute is a question of
law," this Court will "accord no deference to the legal conclusions of the district court but
[will] review them for correctness." State v. Mast, 2001 UT App. 402, f 7, 437 Utah
Adv. Rep. 27 (quoting Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,1f 17, 977 P.2d 1201).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following provisions, whose
text is reproduced in addendum A:
UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 46-1-9 (1998), 76-1-302, and 76-1-303 (1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The State charged defendant with one count of false notarial certification, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-1-9 (1998). R. 1-2. Defendant filed a motion to
dismiss with prejudice, arguing that the prosecution was barred by the statute of
limitations. R. 16-39. The State opposed the motion on the grounds that UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-1-303 extended the statute of limitations an additional one year from the
discovery of the offense. R. 40-56. The trial court ruled that section 76-1-303 did not
apply because the State discovered the offense before the expiration of the original
limitations period. R. 85-89. The trial court then dismissed the case with prejudice. R.
90-91. The State timely appealed. R. 93-94.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As a commissioned notary public, defendant notarized four quit-claim deeds
signed by various signatories between February 12 and March 30 of 1999. R. 41, 51-54,
80. Rather than executing an independent notarial certification each time someone
signed a deed, defendant executed an inclusive notarial certification on each of the deeds
on 30 March 1999. R. 41, 51-54.
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After the deeds were recorded and scanned, they were returned to the individual
signatones via mail on or about 14 ^pnl 1999 R 41, 56 After the deeds were returned
to the signatones, some of the signatones began to question what appeared to be
counterfeit signatures R 32, 35-36, 42 Between June 30 and August 3 of 2000, an
investigator with the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing interviewed
the vanous signatones and learned that defendant was not present when any of them
signed the deeds R 19-20, 29-30, 32-33, 35-37, 42 The investigator also submitted
two of the deeds to a forensic document examiner R 21, 42 On 13 October 2000 the
document examiner issued a report opining that some of the signatures on the deeds were
forged Id
The general two-year statute of limitations for the filing of a misdemeanor
information expired on 30 March 2001 R 18, 42 The information was filed 16 April
2001, seventeen days after the onginal limitations penod expired R 1-2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State agrees with the trial court's ruling that the plain language of section 761-303 extends the statute of limitations for offenses involving fraud or breach of fiduciary
duty, even when the offense is discovered before the onginal limitations penod expires
Interpreting the statute to apply only when the offense is discovered after the onginal
limitations penod expires produces an absurd result Under that interpretation, the State
could not prosecute an offense discovered too close to the expiration of the onginal
limitations penod to investigate and file the case, but could prosecute an offense
3

discovered the day after the limitations period expired. Courts should interpret a statute
to avoid absurd results. Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that the plain
language of section 76-1-303 did not require that the State discover the offense after the
original limitations period expired.
The trial court erred, however, in holding that it could impose such a requirement
upon the statute, in spite of the plain language to the contrary. A court cannot infer
substantive terms into a statute that are not already there. Recognizing the absurdity of
barring the State from prosecuting an offense, simply because it discovered it one day too
early, the Legislature chose not to make section 76-1-303 applicable only when the
offense is discovered after the expiration of the original limitations period. The trial court
therefore erred when it imposed a requirement upon the statute that the Legislature
purposely omitted.
Applying the plain language of section 76-1-303, the State timely filed the
information in this case.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION
76-1-303 DID NOT EXTEND THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS

The trial court ruled that section 76-1-303 did not "require the State to discover the
offense after the expiration of the limitation period." R. 87. The State agrees. The trial
court then ruled, however, that "[e]ven though section 303 may not, by its own terms,
require the State to discover the offense after the expiration of the general limitation
4

period, the courts may impose a similar requirement." R. 87-88. In so ruling, the trial
court imposed upon section 76-1-303 a substantive requirement that does not appear in
the statute. That ruling is erroneous.
A.

The trial court correctly ruled that the plain
language of section 76-1-303 does not require the
State to discover the offense after the original
limitations period expires.

Section 76-1-303 extends the general criminal statute of limitations, found in
section 76-1-302, when a crime involves fraud or a breach of fiduciary duty. UTAH CODE
ANN. §76-1-303(1999). It provides:
(1) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-302 has expired, a prosecution
may be commenced for any offense a material element of which is either
fraud or a breach of fiduciary obligation within one year after discovery of
the offense by an aggrieved party or by a person who has a legal duty to
represent an aggrieved party and who is himself not a party to the offense.
(2) Subsection (1) may not extend the period of limitation as provided in
Section 76-1-302 by more than three years.
Id.
The trial court correctly ruled that section 76-1-303 applies, even when the offense
is discovered prior to the expiration of the original limitations period. R. 87. The plain
language of the statute does not limit its applicability to cases where the offense is
discovered only after the original limitations period expires. Id; UTAH CODE ANN. § 761-303(1999).
When faced with a question of statutory construction, this Court will 'look first to
the plain language of the statute." J J. W. v. State, 2001 UT App. 271, \ 17, 33 P.3d 59
5

(quoting Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 2001 UT 29, U 12, 24 P.3d 928). This Court
will also "presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each
term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Id. However, it "will not infer
substantive terms into the text that are not already there." Id.
The plain language of section 76-1-303 does not require discovery of the offense
to occur after the expiration of the original limitations period. The statute has three
conditions that must be satisfied before it can be applied to extend the original statute of
limitations for criminal offenses. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-303(1) (1999). The
timing of the discovery of the offense is not one of these requirements. Rather, the statute
first requires that the original limitations period expire. Id. Second, the prosecution must
then be commenced "within one year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party
or by a person who has a legal duty to represent an aggrieved party and who is himself not
a party to the offense." Id. Finally, fraud, or breach of fiduciary obligation must be a
material element of the offense for which the limitations period is being extended. Id.
Thus, while the statute clearly applies when an offense is discovered after the expiration
of the original limitations period, the applicability of the statute is not exclusively limited
to that situation. See id.
The statute would have to be rewritten if its application was to be limited to cases
in which an offense is discovered only after the expiration of the original limitations
period. For example, the statute would have to read:

6

A prosecution may be commenced for any offense, a matenal element of
v\hich )s either fraud of a breach of fiduciary obligation, within one year
after discovery of the offense by an aggneved party or by a person who has
a legal duty to represent an aggneved party and who is himself not a party
to the offense, provided the offense was discovered after the period
prescribed in section 76-1-302 has expired
Because statute does not include the emphasized language, the tnal court correctly
concluded that section 76-1-303 does not "require the State to discover the offense after
the expiration of the general limitation penod " R 87.
Other states that have interpreted statutes that are substantively identical to Utah's
section 76-1-303, agree that the statute applies whether the offense is discovered before
or after the expiration of the ongmal limitations penod

l

People v McGreal, 278 N.E.2d

504, 508-09 (111. App. Ct. 1971); State v Wilson, 573 N.W.2d 248, 252-53 (Iowa 1998);
State v Holland, 781 S.W.2d 808, 811-12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); State v Lester, 676
N.E.2d 1270, 1271 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
Section 76-1-303 would produce an absurd result if it only applied when the
offense is discovered after the expiration of the onginal limitations penod For example,
the State would be barred from prosecuting a fraud-based offense that it discovered
within the original limitations penod, but too close to the expiration of the penod to be
able to investigate, screen, and file the case. In other words, the State would be barred
from prosecuting an offense discovered on the last day of the two-year limitations penod,

1

Utah's section 76-1-303, and the similar statutes in other states, are based on the
Model Penal Code. See Model Penal Code and Commentanes, § 1.06; State v Wilson,
573 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Iowa 1998).
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but would be allowed to prosecute an offense discovered the following day. See Wilson,
573 N.W.2d at 253 (recognizing the absurdity of this result).
This Court will '"interpret a statute to avoid absurd consequences.'" Brixen &
Christopher Architects, P.C v. State, 2001 UT App. 210, f 17, 29 P.3d 650 (quoting State
v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, U 12, 992 P.2d 986). Therefore, even if the statute could somehow
be read to imply that an offense must be discovered after the expiration of the original
expiration date, such an interpretation should be rejected because it produces an absurd
result. See id.
Defendant argued below that the State had sufficient time to file this case within
the original limitations period. R. 41-42. However, that fact is irrelevant to the
interpretation of section 76-1-303. The statute either applies when discovery occurs
before the expiration of original limitations period, or it does not.
In drafting section 76-1-303 to apply regardless of when the offense is discovered,
the Legislature reasonably balanced the State's interest in prosecuting crime with a
defendant's interest in avoiding prosecution on a stale charge. For example, when a
fraud-based offense is discovered within one year of its commission, the State is required
to commence a prosecution within the original two-year limitations period. See id. at §
76-1-303 (1999). When a fraud-based offense is discovered more than one year after its
commission, the State must commence a prosecution within one year of discovery, as
long as the original limitations period is not extended more than three years. See id.
Thus, a defendant is never required to defend against a fraud-based charge more than
8

three years after the onginal limitations period would have expired Moreover, when the
State begins a prosecution for a fraud-based offense after the original limitations period
expires, it must do so within a year of discovering the offense. Thus, the statute stnkes a
reasonable balance between the State's and a defendant's interests.
As the tnal court recognized, the plain language of section 76-1-303 does not
require that discovery occur after the expiration of the onginal limitations penod R 87
The tnal court therefore erred m holding that the statute was inapplicable in this case R
87-88.
B.

The trial court erred by imposing upon section 76-1-303
the requirement that discovery of the offense occur after
the expiration of the original limitations period.

Although the tnal court correctly held that the plain language of the statute did not
require the State to discover the offense after the expiration of the onginal limitations
penod, R. 87-88, it ruled that it could impose such a requirement. Id It stated, "[e]ven
though section 303 may not, by its own terms, require the State to discover the offense
after the expiration of the general limitation penod, the courts may impose a similar
requirement " R. 87. When interpreting a statute, however, a court cannot "'infer
substantive terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must
be based on the language used, and [a court has] no power to rewnte the statute to
conform to an intention not expressed.'" Associated Gen Contractors v Board of Oil
Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112, ^ 30, 437 Utah Adv Rep. 35 (quoting Berrett v Purser &
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Edwards, 876 P 2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994)) Thus, the tnal court erred by imposing a
condition upon the statute that the plain language did not already require
The tnal court erred because it imposed a requirement upon section 76-1-303 that
the Legislature omitted from the statute, although this requirement is inherent in other
judicially- and legislatively-created "discovery rules " The tnal court based its erroneous
holding on dictum from O 'Neal v Division of Family Serv ,821 P 2d 1139,1144 (Utah
1991), in which the Utah Supreme Court presumed that before any judicially- or even
legislatively-created "discovery rule" could extend or toll a limitations period, a plaintiff
would have to show that he or she did not know and could not reasonably ha\e known of
the existence of a cause of action within the onginal limitations period R 87-88
Although this dictum is generally correct when applied to judicially-created, and even
most legislatively-created "discovery rules," it cannot be applied to section 76-1-303
because, as discussed above, the Legislature intentionally omitted this requirement from
the statute See Associated Gen Contractors, 2001 UT 112 at ^f 30 (holding that a court
cannot impose a requirement upon a statute that is not there) The tnal court therefore
erred in imposing this requirement upon section 76-1-303.
A "discovery rule" is an exception to the general rule that "a cause of action
accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action"
and that "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not prevent the
running of the statute of limitations." Myers v McDonald, 635 P 2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981)
There are three circumstances in which a "discovery rule" operates as an exception to this
10

general rule. Id. One circumstance is when the Legislature creates a "discovery rule" by
statute. Id. The other two circumstances are judicially created, and apply when: (1) there
is proof of concealment or misleading by the defendant; or (2) exceptional circumstances
exist which would render application of the general rule irrational or unjust. Id.
When applying the two judicially created "discovery rules," Utah courts have
consistently held that neither rule applies unless a plaintiff can show that he or she did not
know and could not reasonably have known of the existence of a cause of action within
the original limitations period. See, e.g., Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Rees, 668 P.2d 1254,
1257 (Utah 1983); Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Const Co., 744 P.2d 1370, 1374
(Utah 1987); O'Neal, 821 P.2d at 1144; Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125,
1129-31 (Utah 1992); Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1231
(Utah 1995); Burkholz v. Joyce, 972 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Utah 1998); Maoris v. Sculptured
Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43,fflj16-18, 24 P.3d 984; Horn v. Utah Dept. of Public Safety,
962 P.2d 95, 101-03 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
As the Utah Supreme Court observed in O Neal, a showing that a plaintiff did not
know and could not have known of his cause of action within the original limitations
period is inherent in the "concealment" and "exceptional circumstances" rules. 821 P.2d
at 1144. Indeed, where a plaintiff discovered or should have discovered his cause of
action within the original limitations period, no concealment has occurred and no
exceptional circumstance would exist to justify extending the statute of limitations.

11

Because neither of these judicially created rules could exist without such a showing, the
showing is a "definitional prerequisite" to these rules. Id. (emphasis added).
Most statutory "discovery rules" also possess this same "definitional prerequisite."
See id. For example, most statutes that create "discovery rules" state that the applicable
statute of limitations does not even begin to run until the plaintiff discovers or should
have discovered the cause of action. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-12-19 (action to
set aside fraudulently sold estate); 78-12-26(1) (action for waste or trespass by
underground works on a mining claim); 78-12-26(2) (loss of branded livestock that have
strayed or been stolen); 78-12-26(3) (fraud); 78-12-27 (actions against corporate
stockholders or directors); 78-14-4 (healthcare malpractice). Thus, the dictum in O 'Neal
is correct to the extent that it refers to these legislatively-created "discovery rules."
Indeed, under these statutes it would be definitionally impossible for a plaintiff to
discover a cause of action before the original limitations period expired, because the
limitations period does not even begin to run until the plaintiff actually discovers or
should have discovered his cause of action.
Section 76-1-303, however, is fundamentally different from the two judiciallycreated "discovery rules," and the above-cited "discovery rules" that the Legislature has
created for civil causes of actions. With both judicially-created "discovery rules," and the
legislatively-created "discovery rules" cited above, "'the limitations period does not begin
to run until the discovery of facts forming the basis of the cause of action.'" O 'Neal, 821
P.2d at 1143 (quoting Myers, 635 P.2d at 86). The limitations period for criminal
12

offenses, however, always beings to run from the commission of the crime. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-1-302 (1999). Nevertheless, section 76-1-303 allows for a limited extension of
the limitations period when the offense involves fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. See id.
§76-1-303.
As discussed above, the Legislature apparently recognized the unfairness of
forcing a criminal defendant to defend against a fraud-based charge more than three years
after the original limitations period had expired. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-303(2).
The Legislature also apparently recognized the unfairness and the absurd result that
would occur if the State were prevented from prosecuting a fraud-based offense that was
discovered within the original limitations period, but not in time to allow for adequate
investigation and screening. See id. § 76-1-303(1). Thus, the Legislature drafted section
76-1-303 to avoid this absurd result, but still place a maximum limit on the extension of
the original limitations period. See id.
While courts can modify and define the scope of the judicially-created "discovery
rules," they cannot modify or redefine the scope of a legislatively-created "discovery
rule." See Associated Gen. Contractors, 2001 UT 112 at ^| 30 (stating that courts cannot
infer substantive terms into statutes). The requirement that a plaintiff discover his or her
cause of action after the expiration of the original statute of limitations is a "definitional
prerequisite" to the judicially created "concealment" and "exceptional circumstances"
rules, and also to many of the legislatively-created "discovery rules." O 'Neal, 821 P.2d at
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1144 The Legislature excluded this requirement from section 76-1-303, however Thus,
the trial court erred when it imposed this additional requirement upon the statute
C.

The State Timely Filed the Information in This Case.

Applying the three-prong test of section 76-1-303(1), the State timely filed the
information in this case 1. The information charged that the crime occurred between 12
February, and 30 March 1999 R. 2. The onginal limitations penod therefore expired on
30 March 2001. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-302(b) (1999). The information was not
filed until 16 Apnl 2001. R. 1-2. Thus, "the penod prescnbed in Section 76-1-302 [had]
expired." UTAH CODE ANN § 76-1-303(1) (1999).
2. However, the information also charged that defendant "executed one or more
notanal certificates known by her to be false; or performed a notanal act with intent to
deceive or defraud." R. 2. Therefore, fraud was a matenal element of the offense See
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-1-303(1) (1999).

3. Furthermore, the State discovered the offense on 30 June 2000, when an
investigator from the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing began
investigating the crime by interviewing two of the signatories of the deeds R 19, 29-30
The information was filed on 16 Apnl 2001. R. 1. Therefore, the "prosecution [was]
commenced . . . within one year after discovery of the offense by an aggneved party or by
a person who has a legal duty to represent an aggneved party and who is himself not a
party to the offense." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-303(1) (1999).

14

Finally, the prosecution was commenced two years and seventeen days after the
crime was committed. R. 1-2. Thus, application of section 76-1-303 did not extend the
original two-year limitations period beyond the three year maximum. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-1-303(2) (1999). The information was therefore timely filed, and the trial
court erred in dismissing this case.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's order of dismissal should be reversed and the case remanded for
further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this Av

day of January, 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

46-1-9. False or incomplete certificate.
A notary may not:
(1) execute a certificate containing a statement known by the notary to be false or
materially incomplete; or
(2) perform any notarial act with intent to deceive or defraud.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 46-1-9 (1998).

76-1-302. Time limitations for prosecution of offenses - Commencement of
prosecution.
(1) Except as otherwise provided, a prosecution for:
(a) a felony or negligent homicide shall be commenced within four years after it is
committed;
(b) a misdemeanor other than negligent homicide shall be commenced within two
years after it is committed; and
(c) any infraction shall be commenced within one year after it is committed.
(2) A prosecution is commenced upon the finding and filing of an indictment by a grand
jury or upon the filing of a complaint or information.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-1-302 (1999).

76-1-303. Time limitations for fraud or breach of fiduciary obligation and
misconduct of public officer or employee.
(1) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-302 has expired, a prosecution may be
commenced for any offense a material element of which is either fraud or a breach of
fiduciary obligation within one year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party
or by a person who has a legal duty to represent an aggrieved party and who is himself not
a party to the offense.
(2) Subsection (1) may not extend the period of limitation as provided in Section
76-1-302 by more than three years.
(3) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-301.5 or 76-1-302 has expired, a prosecution
may be commenced for:

(a) any offense based upon misconduct in office by a public officer or public
employee:
(i) at any time during which the defendant holds a public office or during the
period of his public employment; or
(ii) within two years after termination of defendant's public office or public
employment.
(b) Except as provided in Section 76-1-301.5, Subsection (3) shall not extend the
period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than three years.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-1-303 (1999).

Addendum B

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 9£iift$56i*M06

Plaintiff,
vs.
MARIE S. McKINNON,

HON. BEN H. HADFIELD

Defendant.

The parties submit the case for decision on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
with Prejudice. Defendant argues that the Information was filed beyond the two year
statute of limitations and that the discovery rule of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-303 is
inapplicable. The State argues that both thefraudand the misconduct in office portions
of section 303fs discovery rule apply.
Section 303(1), the discovery rule forfraud,provides:
(1) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-302 has expired, a
prosecution may be commenced for any offense a material element
of which is either fraud or a breach of fiduciary obligation within
one year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party or by
a person who has a legal duty to represent an aggrieved party and
who is himself not a party to the offense.
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Section 303(3), the discovery rule for misconduct in officer provides:
(3) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-301.5 or 76-1-302 has
expired, a prosecution may be commenced for:
(a) any offense based upon misconduct in office by a public officer
or public employee:
(i) at any time during which the defendant holds a public office or
during the period of his public employment; or
(ii) within two years after termination of defendant's public office
or public employee

Both sections contain the introductory clause "if the period prescribed in [the applicable
general limitation statute] has expired." Defendant argues that the phrase has no
meaning unless it means that the discovery rule of section 303 applies only if the State
first learns of the offense after the statute of limitations has run.
The court can conceive of one other circumstance where the phrase would
have meaning. If the Defendant had committed the offense less than a year before the
State learned of the offense, section 303, without the introductory and limiting phrase
quoted above, would decrease the two year period of the general statute. For example,
say that the Defendant committed the offense on 1 July 1999 and the state learned of the
offense on 1 August 1999. If the statute read:
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(1) If the period prescribed in Section 76" 1-3 02 has expired, A
prosecution may be commenced for any offense a material element
of which is either fraud or a breach of fiduciary obligation within
one year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party or by
a person who has a legal duty to represent an aggrieved party and
who is himself not a party to the offense,

then the Defendant could argue that the limitation period was one year from 1 August
1999, effectively cutting the limitation period in half— an absurd result. The legislature
may have wanted to avoid that absurd result when it included the limiting introductory
clause in 303(1) and (3). The Defendant's argument that the phrase can only have
meaning ~ that the State must discover the cause of action after the general statute of
limitation has run — fails, and the court will not rule that the language of section 303
requires that result.
Even though section 303 may not, by its own terms, require the State to
discover the offense after the expiration of the general limitation period, the courts may
impose a similar requirement. Defendant cites numerous civil cases which invoke the
requirement. The State argues that none of those cases involve a legislatively created
discovery rule as this one does. But the state cannot point to a case involving a statute
where the requirement is rejected. The parties agree that dicta in O 'Neal v. Division of
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Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139, 1144 (Utah 1991) seems to apply the requirement in
all cases whether the discovery rule is legislated or judicially created.

Without

additional guidance from the appellate courts, this court finds the dicta in O'Neal
persuasive and will follow the dictafromO 'Neal in holding that, for the discovery rule
of section 303 to apply, the state must have discovered the action after the general statue
of limitations has run.
The Defendant's motion is granted; Defendant's counsel shall prepare the
order.
Dated this ^H

day of August 2001.

